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Expropriation Under Mexican Law and
Its Insertion into a Global Context
Under NAFTA
BYRAYMUNDO E. ENRIQUEZ*
Transcript of Remarks
Professor William S. Dodge (Moderator): I have the pleasure
now to introduce Raymundo Enriquez of Baker & McKenzie in
Mexico City, a professor at Universidad Iberoamericana, [a] graduate
from Universidad Iberoamericana with a J.D., [who] has an Ll.M.
from Harvard and an I.T.P. from Harvard. I must confess, I don't
know what an I.T.P. from Harvard is, so perhaps you can illuminate
that for us. He's served as a panelist on a number of panels under
various chapters of the NAFTA, assisted as legal counsel in numerous
anti-dumping and investment matters under the NAFrA, and will
talk to us about expropriation under Mexican law and its insertion in
a global context under the NAFrA. Thank you very much.
Professor Raymundo E. Enriquez: Thank you. Just for the
record, I.T.P. [is] the international tax program.
Let me start by thanking the Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review for the opportunity of being here and try to
share with you some of my thoughts regarding the application of
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA [to] the expropriation of investment[s] in
a rather not-so-practical manner, or in a [way] that would not be as
practical as the ones that we have heard.... [And] again, I have to
stress that we're very fortunate to have some of you here that do have
that practical experience in this topic.
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Mexico City, Mexico. Professor, Universidad
Iberoamericana. LI.M., International Tax Program, Harvard University ; J.D.,
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To nobody it is a surprise that NAFTA was a turning point for
Mexico in a variety of [respects], and certainly the legal scenario was
not an exception. Six years now after its enactment, the benefits for
the three countries certainly have been evident. [And] we're still in
the process of absorbing the full impact of such a partnership at all
levels in the legal system ....
The challenge of the NAFTA negotiators was to set rules that
would apply to totally different legal systems and ... cultural ...
backgrounds that in many instances were in [tension]. I think that
was the challenge, and I think that they did a great job, but they could
not perceive all of the impacts that this would have in the different
cultures.
And one, in my opinion, is the institution of expropriation, which
is a very... deep-rooted concept in Mexico. And I'm not referring to
it only from a legal sense, but also from a political and historical
perspective .... Expropriation has certainly been a tool that the
Mexican government has used when ... such mergers have created
international effects, and this is clear in two instances that I can
remember . . . . They have also served to foster a . . . very
nationalistic spirit or sentiment within the Mexican population, so we
cannot isolate the concept of expropriation in Mexico just to the legal
effects without giving due care to the political and economic effects of
such a measure.
[I am] here referring to the [two] most.., visible expropriations
•.. in this last century .... And I'm referring to the old industry, for
one instance, in the thirties, and, more recently, as Professor
[Frederick M.] Abbott referred to as well, to the banking industry. It
did not have a huge impact, not only in Mexico, not only from a legal
perspective, but also from [the] political and economic [perspectives],
and that . gave, perhaps, a wrong signal to our trading partners.
And now we're seeing the effects of that. [We saw it] when they
entered into [the] negotiations [concerning] NAFTA. Certainly those
measures had an impact in the investor country. [So] I think that
Mexico had to agree, in some instances, to clauses or commitments
that otherwise would have not been needed .... I am certain that
those commitments that were assumed by Mexico, which are now
contained in Chapter Eleven, must have [been a response to the]
negotiations, where the expected ultimate economic and political
benefits were greater. But as a lawyer, I cannot escape the
temptation to make some observations in this regard.
In my opinion, for the reasons that I will attempt to explain, the
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rules governing expropriation, and the dispute settlement mechanism
contained therein, neglected a position that Mexico [had] sustained
for many years, both intellectually and legally, known as the Calvo
Doctrine, which is now implemented in the Mexican legislation
through the Calvo Clause. And, in some instances, and this could be
a little bit ... academic... , [the rules may be] contrary to our
constitutional principles.
When I'm referring to the Calvo Doctrine, I don't intend to enter
into the different justifications of [the] doctrine, nor will I share my
views on its merits. I will simply [impart] the view that the Mexican
government has stated in the past on this topic.
Mexico's adoption of the Calvo is quite understandable if we
take a quick look at the history of the [United States] and Mexico and
the routine, in Mexico, of diplomatic relationships in the past,
especially in the eighteenth century. Both Europe and the United
States embarked on military interventions to the Mexican Territory
[due to] property or investment disputes. Such a political
environment, certainly, put more emphasis on one of the principles of
the Calvo Doctrine, which was to prevent foreign interventions or
diplomatic pressure from states with greater strength, both . . .
economic[ally] and militar[ily]. But ... that was only one of the
principles ....
And this is something [with which] I'm confronted very
frequently [by] our clients when they want to organize a Mexican
corporation. ... [T]hey have to insert this Calvo Clause, and say,
"What's this? I mean, what is my commitment, what is my
commitment here?" And of course the traditional approach to this is
not that they will ask the Marines to go down to Mexico in case of a
dispute. So I think that at least that perception of the Calvo is no
longer valid.
But, again, I don't think that was the only principle of such
doctrines. Commentators, I believe, tend to agree that the Calvo
Doctrine involves the following principles: (1) no alien may enjoy
additional rights [beyond] those granted to nationals, and I want to
stress this one; (2) the application of domestic law to aliens, or their
property, shall not give rise to diplomatic protection... ; (3) any
dispute derived from foreign investment, or negotiations in
connection therewith, must be resolved by local courts, and in
accordance with domestic law.
This, of course, we have learned, is no longer a valid principle
under international principles. But... let me just quote a Mexican
2000]
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diplomatic, a great Mexican diplomat and academic, Mr. Alfonso
Alcia Robles, when he summarized the Calvo Doctrine in the
following sentence: "The Calvo Clause commitment merely places the
alien in a position of equality with the nationals." And I think that
this is a much more contemporaneous approach to this principle.
[This] principle was the basis of a provision ... in the Mexican
Constitution that specifically reads, "Foreigners must agree before
the Mexican government to consider themselves as Mexicans
regarding their property, and to bind themselves not to invoke the
protection of their governments with respect to such property."
Somebody could perhaps say that the constitution was drafted in
1917, and perhaps that concept is now outdated, and perhaps that the
Mexican government is no longer committed to that principle ....
Contrary to that position, I could argue that we note, we need to
note, that the regulations of the foreign investment law, which were
enacted in 1998-this is four years after signing or executing
NAFTA-have two references to this constitutional provision. In the
first, it prescribes that in order for a foreigner to own real estate in
Mexico, he or she must agree to the Calvo Clause. Second,
companies with the ability to admit foreign investors must include in
their by-laws an agreement by which any foreign shareholder must
abide by the terms of the Calvo Clause. This indicates to me that
only three years ago this was the position of the Mexican government,
and it is a valid concept, and it is a valid position that the Mexican
government is willing to take.
The rationale, in my view of [this] provision, is that any foreigner
wishing to invest in another country must accept the legal standards
of such other country. This is part of the investment risk analysis that
any investor is expected to make when committing its own resources.
That's just to say due diligence, whenever you're going to a
different-even locally, [and] certainly . .. international[ly]-when
you are going to acquire a company, when you're going to invest, you
need to do due diligence, and that's going to be part of your risk
analysis. Attempting otherwise, now in a global economy such as the
one we're currently experiencing, would be to neglect a reality.
From any investor's perspective, in my opinion, the only case in
which it would be justifiable to seek government protection at this
stage would be in those cases where the denial of justice is present. I
think that's the only case in which it would be justifiable for an
investor, at this stage, to seek the protection of its government.
And what should we understand by "denial of justice"? I make
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reference to a definition by [a] Harvard research [study], when it said
[that a "denial of justice" may consist of] "a denial, unwarranted
delay, or obstruction of access to courts, [a] gross deficiency in the
administration of judicial or remedial process, [a] failure to provide
those guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the
proper administration of justice, or a manifest unjust judgement."
With all due respect, I don't believe that those conditions are present
in the Mexican legal system, although I recognize that there might be
some flaws, and there might be a different perspective, which I fully
recognize as a Mexican practitioner, but not to the extent that would
necessarily... justify the intervention of a foreign government.
If the above is true, the question would be, to me, why the
Mexican government allowed, under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA,
alternate methods of defense to foreigners from those available to
local investors in the event of an expropriation. That would be, for
me, the question.
As you all know, if we make a review of the provisions, we will
find that a foreign resident of a NAFTA country whose investment
was expropriated by the Mexican government would have the ability
to challenge such action not only through the legal procedures
contemplated in the domestic expropriation law, but also through the
arbitration procedure, of course following the rules contained therein
.... And to me the question would be: Wouldn't this violate the
principle contained in the Calvo Clause incorporated into . .
Mexican [law]? To me, it is clear [that the answer is yes], by not
placing the alien in the same position as the national.
Furthermore, if at the time the foreigner acquired property in
Mexico-either real estate or stock in a Mexican company-he or she
agreed to be considered as a national with respect to such property,
or such investment, wouldn't that prevent him or her from enjoying a
legal remedy available only to foreigners under NAFTA? We need
to remember that, under the Calvo Clause, it [one must] agree to be
treated as a national. Somebody can argue that a foreigner initiating
an arbitration procedure under NAFTA is not in violation of such [a]
commitment because under such a procedure, he or she is not
necessarily invoking the protection of his or her government. I would
agree with that perception. However, this constitutional provision
contains two different and distinct [prongs]. The first one is that the
foreigner should be considered as a national. And the second is [that
the foreigner will] not invoke the protection of [his or her]
government. Any flaw in either of these [prongs] would, in my view,
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constitute a violation of the agreement entered into by the foreign
individual with the Mexican government.
And I am by no means opposing the concept of arbitration.
Certainly we have seen that in the past, in very different forms,... it
[has been a] good alternative-perhaps not as expeditious based on
the experience that some of our colleagues have had, but certainly it's
an [area] where an investor will feel more comfortable going, rather
than to the local courts, for whatever reasons. And Mexico, I think,
was receptive to that. If we go back to the political situation and the
need for foreign investment at the time, we cannot really put a lot of
blame on the Mexican government for accepting those mechanisms.
We were pursuing foreign investment before the investors. Again, as
Professor Abbott mentioned .... they need that protection. It's a
justifiable protection that they need, and I'm not opposed to that.
Mexico even enacted legislation at that time allowing the
Mexican government to enter into international treaties allowing for
dispute settlement mechanisms, and I'm referring to ... the law for
the execution of treaties, which was enacted in 1992 if I recall
correctly. Certain other pieces of legislation were introduced in
anticipation of NAFrA. In the past, for instance,... Pemex, the
Mexican oil company and the electricity and utility company which
both are owned by the Mexican government, by their own law were
prohibited, in the event of entering into contracts, [from] agree[ing]
to any forum other than the Mexican federal courts. Now they have
the ability to enter into arbitration, if that's the case, and they agreed
to that with their counterpart, and this was all in anticipation of
NAFTA.
And, again, I'm not, I'm really not opposing the mechanism, but
the Mexican government expressed at that time that such mechanisms
were not in violation of the Calvo Clause under the argument that if
the foreign government agrees to such [a] procedure as a legal avenue
to resolve disputes, [that] government is in fact agreeing to not
intervene in the event of a dispute with one of its citizens. I can agree
with [this] view, but that is not the point. The problem is that such
remedies are not available on a consistent basis. In other words,
why-and I can understand the need to include those mechanisms
during negotiations when we were badly needing foreign investment,
and that certainly has created a lot of well-being for Mexico in terms
of employment, in terms of having the security to export our trades,
etc.-but the problem, to me, is that I believe a more coherent
approach would have been to allow the same legal remedies to
[Vol. 23:385
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everybody.
•.. I'm trying to put myself in the shoes of the foreign investor
countries, where they might feel that in the event that either they
were prevented from a dispute settlement such as arbitration and they
were forced first into the local laws, they still had the Chapter Twenty
avenue available for them in case they felt that the Mexican courts
were, in fact, denying . . . proper justice to their investors. And
perhaps another approach would have been just to maintain the same
legal remedies for everybody, and to not make this discrimination,
which, again, in my view, violates the principle and the legislation
which is now currently in place in Mexico.
And you might say, "Well, this is highly theoretical," because
who would be the beneficiary of the agreement entered into by the
foreigner under the Calvo Clause but the Mexican government? So
when would that happen? [That is,] when would the Mexican
government, [which] signed this agreement with the NAFTA
countries, consider this as a breach or [an] attempt to make any
distinction based exclusively on [the] Calvo Clause? And, I would
tend to say, "Yes, this could be highly theoretical-under the present
circumstances."
And the present circumstances might change. For the first time, I
believe that Mexico has entered into a very deep democratic process.
I think that we have had a government from the same party for over
sixty, seventy years. And for the first time, we will be confronted with
an election where we don't know who is going to win, and this might
sound a little bit weird for you in the States, but I'm just very briefly
recalling a conversation where there were diplomats from the United
States, Europe, etc., and one of the representatives from a foreign
country was saying and bragging that they were very pleased with the
new software that they had installed, because now they were going to
be able to know who the winner in the presidential election would be
three or four hours after the polls were closed. And the Mexican
representative said, "Well, that's no good to me, since we know well
in advance-prior to the election-who the [next] president... will
be!" So, again, even though it's going to be a highly theoretical point,
I think that if for some reason the political climate in Mexico changes
dramatically, this could be a [theory] that could be used by someone.
Thank you very much.
Professor Dodge: Thank you very much, Mr. Enriquez. That
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raised a lot of thought-provoking questions in terms of the
relationship between treaty norms and legislative norms in the
Mexican legal system, and also questions of how these might come up
procedurally in the NAFTA dispute settlement context.
